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INTERNATIONAL LAW-AcTIONS AGAINST SOVEREIGN
OR INSTRUMENTALITY-Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 Provides the Sole Basis for Obtaining Jurisdiction
Over Foreign States in United States Courts. Argentine Re-
public v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 12, 1982, the Argentine Republic invaded the
British colony off the eastern coast of Argentina known as
the Falkland Islands, and war between the two countries
ensued.' On June 8, 1982, without any provocation or
warning, Argentine military aircraft bombed the Hercules,
a Liberian owned crude oil tanker, while the ship was in
international waters outside the war zone designated by
the two belligerents. The tanker suffered extensive dam-
age and was finally scuttled off the Brazilian coast.2 After
unsuccessful attempts to pursue their damage claims in
Argentina, the Liberian owner and charterer of Hercules
brought suit against the Argentine Republic in the South-
ern District of New York. The district court dismissed
I The Falkland Islands are known as Malvinas to the Spanish-speaking world.
For a historical account of the Falkland War, see Freedman, The War of the Falkland
Islands, 1968, 61 FOREIGN AFF. 196 (1982).
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73, 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
The Hercules was owned by United Carriers, Inc. and chartered by Amerada Hess
Shipping Corporation, both Liberian corporations, for transport of crude oil from
Alaska to the Virgin Islands. Because the tanker was too wide to pass through the
locks of the Panama Canal, the Hercules sailed between the two destinations by
travelling around the southern tip of South America at Cape Horn. The bombing
caused extensive damage to the decks and hull of the Hercules, and an un-
detonated bomb was lodged in her starboard side. Following an assessment by
the Brazilian navy, United Carriers decided that it would be too risky to remove
the bomb and repair the ship. Accordingly, the Hercules was sunk 250 miles off
the coast of Brazil. Id.
.1 Id. United Carriers claimed damages of $10,000,000 for the loss of the ship
and Amerada Hess claimed a loss of $1,901,259.07 on the fuel that went down
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the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 4
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and re-
manded, holding that the FSIA did not preempt a grant of
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute6 (ATS) which al-
lowed an alien to sue a foreign state in the United States
courts for torts committed in violation of international
law.7 Since the bombing of a neutral merchant vessel
outside the designated war zone clearly constituted a vio-
lation of international law, the Second Circuit concluded
that federal courts could assert jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to the ATS. 8 The Supreme Court granted certi-
with the tanker. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d
421, 423 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
4 Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 77. The court held that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA) did not repeal the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) but only nar-
rowed the class of defendants under the ATS to non-sovereign state entities. Id.
at 76. The district court was adamant that the FSIA remained the exclusive basis
for asserting jurisdiction over a sovereign state: "A foreign state is subject tojuris-
diction in the courts of this nation if, and only if, an FSIA exception empowers the
court to hear the case." Id. at 75 (emphasis added). Since plaintiff's claims fell
outside the exceptions to the blanket immunity accorded to a foreign state by the
FSIA, the court granted Argentina's motion to dismiss. Id. at 77. For a discussion
of the FSIA and the ATS, see infra notes 11-103 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1988).
6 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
7 Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 422-23.
8 Id. at 423-26. With respect to the relation between the FSIA and ATS, the
court concluded that given the emphasis on commercial concerns in enacting the
FSIA and the absence of any explicit indications in the legislative history that the
FSIA preempted ATS in cases where foreign sovereigns were sued, the FSIA did
not preempt the jurisdiction of ATS in this case. Id. at 426-27. The dissenting
opinion asserted that "the plain language of this provision (§ 1602 of the FSIA)
means that the FSIA established the exclusive framework within which the courts
of the United States were, from 1976 onward, to rule on foreign states' claims of
sovereign immunity." Id. at 430 (Kerase, J., dissenting). Agreeing with the dis-
trict court, Judge Kearse found that since the present case did not fall within any
exceptions under FSIA, the case should be dismissed for want of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 431.
The Second Circuit decision in Amerada Hess quickly drew adverse comments.
Commentators criticized the court for ignoring clear legislative intent to make
FSIA the exclusive basis of jurisdiction over foreign states. Note, Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic: An Alien Tort Statute Exception to Foreign Sovereign
Immunity, 72 MINN. L. REV. 829, 845 (1988) [hereinafter Note, 72 MINN. L. REV.].
For other criticisms, see DiBiagio, Federal Jurisdiction over Foreign Governments for
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orari9 and rendered a unanimous decision in Argentine Re-
public v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. (Amerada Hess).'0 Held,
Reversed: the FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in United States courts,
and the district court correctly dismissed the action be-
cause the FSIA did not authorize jurisdiction over the Ar-
gentine Republic under the facts of this case."
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court's decision in Amerada Hess is impor-
tant in that it unequivocally declares the preemptive na-
ture of the FSIA in relation to the ATS. A brief survey of
the FSIA and ATS is therefore essential to the under-
standing of the legal context surrounding the decision.
A. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The notion of sovereign immunity provides exemption
to a sovereign state from the jurisdiction of the courts of
other nations.' 2 The concept historically originated from
an era in which monarchical power was inviolable'3 and
Violation of International Law: Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Alien Tort Statute after
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 12 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 153,
155 (1988) (by ruling that the Argentine armed forces violated international law
and therefore was subject to civil liability in a United States federal court, the
Second Circuit arbitrarily interfered with the constitutional duty of the executive
in formulating the tenor of American diplomatic relations); Note, Implied Waiver
Under the FSIA: A Froposed Exception to Immunity for Violation of the Preemptory Norms of
International Law, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 365, 373 n.46 (1989) (hereinafter Note, 77
CALIF. L. REV.] (the Second Circuit's decision permits an inequitable result in that
a foreign alien is allowed to bring a tort action against a foreign sovereign in
United States courts but similar remedy is not available to a United States citizen
because only an alien may invoke the ATS); Note, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v.
Argentine Republic: Denying Sovereign Immunity to Violators of International Law, 39 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1109, 1131 (1988) [hereinafter Note, 39 HASTINGS L.J.] ("[T]he Second
Circuit's decision was apparently designed to circumvent the clear language of the
FSIA.... [T]he court attempted to justify a preconceived decision to assert sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the case").
9 485 U.S. 1005 (1988).
lo 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
, Id at 443.
12 T. GIUTrARI, THE AMERICAN LAw OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNrrv 1 (1970).
1, Id. at 7.
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the sovereign could do no wrong. 4 The exercise of au-
thority by one sovereign over another would naturally be
considered inappropriate and represented an act of hos-
tility.' 5 The principle gradually developed into a norm of
international law,' 6 and two schools of thought have
emerged to provide justifications for the immunity con-
cept. One theory holds that sovereign immunity is based
on the mutual equality and independence of states.' 7 Im-
munity is seen as a fundamental right inseparable from
the dignity and independence of a sovereign state.'8 An-
other theory contends that the granting of immunity by
one sovereign state to another is premised upon the no-
tion of international comity,' 9 motivated by the "desire to
promote good will and reciprocal courtesies among
nations."20
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was first pro-
nounced in the United States by Supreme Court Chief
Justice John Marshall in the landmark case of The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon.2 ' The case represented the judicial
adoption of the absolute sovereign immunity principle in
the United States.2 2 Under this principle a foreign state
'4 R. LILLICH, THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 1 (1965).
'- T. GIUTrARI, supra note 12, at 7.
16 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 451 introductory note (1988) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("The immunity of a
state from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state is an undisputed principle
of customary international law").
17 E. ALLEN, THE POSITON OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 4
(1983); see also L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 266-67 (1955).
8 See Note, 72 MINN. L. REV., supra note 8, at 832; see also Note, Effects Jurisdiction
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Due Process Clause, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
474, 476 (1980).
19 Angell, Sovereign Immunity--The Modern Trend 35 YALE L.J. 150, 152-153
(1925); see also Riesenfeld, Sovereign Immunity in Perspective, 19 VAND. J. OF TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1, 2 (1986).
vo T. GutTrARI, supra note 12, at 6; see also Cardozo, Judicial Deference To State
Department Suggestions: Recognition of Preogative or Abdication to Usurper?, 48 CORNELL
L.Q. 461, 468-69 (1963).
21 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). In granting sovereign immunity to France in
a suit for possession of a schooner, ChiefJustice Marshall declared that sovereign
immunity was not based on a rule of law, but on the concept of grace and comity.
Id. at 136.
22 T. GuITrARI, supra note 12, at 8.
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cannot be sued or impleaded in the courts of other coun-
tries without its consent.2 Absolute sovereign immunity
prevailed in the United States until the early 1950s.24 The
doctrine began to draw criticism during the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, and this attack gathered extra mo-
mentum in the post World War I era. In an effort to reor-
ganize their war-shattered economies, national
governments began to adopt a more active role in the
business and economic affairs of the nations. As business
transactions between national governments and private
parties increased, so did disputes and litigation. 5 Critics
deplored the absolute immunity doctrine as producing in-
equitable results, because private parties' claims were
often dismissed regardless of the merits of their cases.
Some commentators blamed the absolute immunity doc-
trine for distorting the operation of the market by trans-
ferring the risk of doing business from the government to
the private party. To maintain the proper function of a
market economy, it became necessary to restrict the scope
of sovereign immunity.26
Advocates of a restrictive version of sovereign immu-
nity finally won the support of the United States Govern-
ment in 1952. In that year, the State Department
declared its adoption of the restrictive sovereign immu-
nity theory in the famous Tate Letter.27 Under this the-
ory, a foreign state enjoys immunity only with respect to
claims arising out of its public acts; it is not immune from
claims concerning activities that a private person could
perform, notably commercial or business activities. 28 The
restrictive immunity theory has since become the gov-
erning doctrine in the United States.
23 P. SHEPARD, SOVEREIGNTY AND STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL ENTITIES 5-6
(1951).
24 DiBiagio, supra note 8, at 156-57.
2 5 T. GurrrARI, supra note 12, at 63-84.
26 Note, 77 CALIF. L. REV., supra note 8, at 379-80.
27 Letter from Jack Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Acting
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BuLL.
984-85 (1952).
2 RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 451 comment a.
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Traditionally, the State Department would provide writ-
ten suggestions to the judiciary on the question of
whether foreign sovereign immunity should be granted in
a particular case.2 9 Such suggestions were initially advi-
sory in nature, but in a series of cases in the 1930s and
40s, the Supreme Court declared that the advice of the
executive branch should be taken as conclusive determi-
nations by the court without independent judicial in-
quiry.30 That high degree of deference is based upon the
notion of separation of powers and the recognition that
foreign relations is one of the constitutional prerogatives
vested in the executive branch .3  Executive determination
of immunity was highly politicized, however, and jurisdic-
tion was often denied or granted on nonlegal grounds,
such as the strength of diplomatic pressure a foreign gov-
ernment could exert on the State Department.3 2 To make
matters worse, the State Department was not the only au-
thority from which foreign state defendants could request
immunity. The defendants could bypass the executive
branch and go directly to the courts. In such case, the
responsibility of determining immunity requests rested
solely with the judiciary. Hence, sovereign immunity de-
terminations were made by two independent branches of
the government, each using different criteria in making its
decision.33 The dual decision-making process not only
Ex Parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 532-33 (1921).
'o See Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) ("It is ... not for the courts to
deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an
immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize.");
Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943) (State Department's certification of the
immunity of a foreign vessel will be taken as conclusive determination that contin-
ued retention of the vessel interferes with the proper conduct of the country's
foreign relations. Upon submission of the certificate to the court, it is the duty of
the court to release the vessel and dismiss the case); Compania Espanola de Nave-
gacion Maritima v. Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938) (if the claim of sovereign
immunity is recognized and allowed by the executive branch of the government, it
is the duty of the courts to release the foreign vessels under detention).
31 See Feldman, Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the United States Courts 1976-1986, 19
VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 19, 20 (1986); see also Cardozo, supra note 20, at 468-
72.
32 Note, 77 CALIF. L. REV., supra note 8, at 369.
" Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487-88 (1983).
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produced inconsistent and unpredictable results, 4 but
also encouraged the foreign state defendants to forum
shop between the judiciary and the State Department. 5
Moreover, even if a plaintiff could secure a judgment
against a foreign state, the chance of successfully recover-
ing damages was extremely small because the courts still
followed the absolute immunity doctrine in the execution
of judgments.3 6 It was against this confusing state of af-
fairs that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)3 7
was enacted.
When the Congress enacted the FSIA in 1976, the
United States became the first sovereign state to codify
the law of foreign sovereign immunity in a statute.3 8 The
Act accomplishes four basic objectives. First, it codifies
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, thereby pro-
viding a uniform judicial standard for all parties to fol-
low.3 9 Second, the FSIA transfers the responsibility for
determining questions of sovereign immunity from the
State Department to the courts. 40 The shift ensures that
immunity questions are judged on purely legal grounds
and that the procedure comports with the requirements of
due process. 4' Ending executive domination in this area
would eliminate the previous haphazard and inconsistent
decision-making and depoliticize the whole process of im-
munity determination. 42 Third, the Act provides a com-
prehensive procedural framework for obtaining subject
- See Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning and
Effect, 3 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 11-13, 15-17 (1976).
- Id. at 11.
36 See Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Perspec-
tive: A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & CoMP.L.Q. 302, 304 (1986).
-7 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1988)).
3- Feldman, supra note 31, at 19.
31 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6605 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
40 See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988).
4 ' HOUSE REPORT, supra note 39, at 6606.
4 Note, Sovereign Immunity.--Limits ofJudicial Control--The Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, 18 HARV. INT'L LJ. 429, 436
(1977).
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matter and personal jurisdiction over a foreign state and
creates related statutory procedure for making service.4
Fourth, the statute modifies the application of absolute
sovereign immunity theory in the execution of ajudgment
and allows the plaintiff, under certain conditions, to attach
property of a foreign state located in the United States to
satisfy the judgment. 4
As a general rule, a foreign state is immune from the
jurisdiction of courts of the United States under the
FSIA. 45 This blanket grant of immunity is subject to a list
of exceptions, mainly concerning commercial or private
activities of the foreign state.4 6 Specifically, the exception
applies where: (1) a foreign state has waived its immu-
nity;47 (2) the action is based upon or related to a com-
mercial activity carried on by the foreign state;48
(3) rights in property are taken in violation of interna-
tional law;49 (4) rights in property in the United States ac-
quired by succession or gifts are involved; 5° (5) the action
concerns certain noncommercial torts within the United
States;5 (6) a maritime lien based upon commercial activ-
ity of a foreign state is involved; 52 or (7) the action in-
volves certain counterclaims. 3 Significantly, the FSIA
provides no general exception to immunity based on vio-
lations of international law other than when property is
taken in violation of such law.
4., 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), (b); HousE REPORT, supra note 39, at 6606.
44 28 U.S.C. § 1610; HousE REPORT, supra note 39, at 6606.
4., 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988). The broad grant of immunity is subject to existing
international agreements to which the United States was a party at the time of the
enactment of the FSIA. Id.
" 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607, (1988).
47 Id. § 1605(a)(1).
40 Id. § 1605(a)(2).
49 Id. § 1605(a)(3).
- Id. § 1605(a)(4).
s, Id. § 1605(a)(5).
52 Id. § 1605(b).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1988).
CASENOTES
B. Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), enacted as part of the
First Judiciary Act of 1789, 54 provides that "[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States. 55
The ATS has been described by Judge Friendly as a
"legal Lohengrin" because "no one seems to know
whence it came."-56 The rationale for enacting the statute
remains largely unknown as no direct or indirect legisla-
tive history exists. Commentators have theorized that
the Congress had three particular purposes in mind when
it passed the ATS. First, the newly formed federal gov-
ernment believed that cases involving foreign nationals
would inevitably affect the country's foreign relations,
hence the federal government should exercise control
over such suits.5 Second, before the enactment of ATS,
suits brought by foreigners were heard by state courts.
To achieve uniformity in dealing with cases that had inter-
national implications, Congress believed that it was neces-
sary to transfer jurisdiction from the state judiciary to
federal courts.5 9 Third, the newly formed federal govern-
ment was anxious to gain international acceptance. The
ATS was enacted as a gesture of comity whereby nationals
of foreign countries were given an exclusive grievance re-
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (1845).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
.16 IIT, an International Investment Trust v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015
(2d Cir. 1975). The title character of a Wagner opera, "Lohengrin" is a shadowy
figure who appears mystically to rescue a maiden and then vanishes as quickly as
he has come.
57 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D. C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). There was no discussion
of the Alien Tort Statute in the House debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789 and
the Senate debates over the same Act were not recorded. Id.
-I See Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the
Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 19-20 (1985).
ml See Comment, Enforcing the Customary International Law of Human Rights in Fed-
eral Court, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 133-34 (1986). See also Randall, supra note 58, at
21 (promoter of ATS considered state courts parochial in nature and more likely
to deny justice to foreign nationals).
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dressing mechanism not previously available. 6°
The ATS provides that only an alien can invoke juris-
diction. A United States citizen cannot bring suit under
the ATS but can be sued by an alien under the statute's
provisions. 6 1 The ATS has not clearly defined the class of
defendants, but plaintiffs have brought suits under the
statute against foreign states,62 business corporations,63
and individuals. 64 The obscure language of the Act has
created considerable uncertainty as to the meaning of "vi-
olation of the law of the nations" and "tort only." 65
The ATS has been in the statute books for more than
200 years. The statute, however, is rarely invoked,66 in
part due to its obscure origin and cryptic language. To
date, federal courts have sustained jurisdiction under the
ATS in only three cases. The first successful invocation of
ATS was in Bolchos v. Darrel.67 In this case, the district
court of South Carolina sustained jurisdiction over an ac-
tion involving the interpretation of a treaty between the
United States and France to determine the status of slaves
- See Randall, supra note 58, at 20-22.
81 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Judge Bork suggested in Tel-Oren that the ATS was specifi-
cally intended to protect foreign ambassador plaintiffs. 726 F.2d at 813-14 (Bork,
J., concurring). The statute in its final form was, however, drafted in general
catchall language which permits any alien to invoke jurisdiction. See Casto, The
Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Na-
tions, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 499 (1986).
62 See e.g., Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246
(D.D.C. 1985), vacated, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990) (relatives of a Swedish diplo-
mat sued the USSR for wrongful imprisonment and possible death of the
diplomat).
6- See e.g., lIT, 519 F.2d at 1001 (Luxemburg investment trust sued a
Bahamanian corporation for fraud, conversion, and corporate waste).
- See e.g., Cohen v. Hartman, 490 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1980), afd per curiam
634 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981) (a Canadian employer sued his em-
ployee, also a Canadian, for embezzlement allegedly committed within the United
States).
65 Note, 72 MINN. L. REV., supra note 8, at 839. For the language of the Act, see
supra note 54 and accompanying text.
-See Comment, Foreign Sovereign Immunity After Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v.
Argentine Republic: Did It Go Down with the Hercules?, 11 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 660, 673
(1988). In the two hundred year existence of ATS, there have been around forty
reported cases brought under the statute. Id.
67 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607).
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aboard a captured Spanish warship. 68 After a long period
of dormancy, the district court of Maryland in 1961
granted jurisdiction again under ATS in Abdul-Rahman
Omar Adra v. Clift.69 In that case, the court sustained juris-
diction over a child custody action by a Lebanese national
against his former wife. The court found that falsification
of the wife's passport to conceal the child's nationality was
a violation of the law of nations, and the wife had commit-
ted a tort by removing the child from her father's
custody.7 °
A more recent and celebrated use of the ATS as a basis
for jurisdiction was in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.71 In Filartiga,
a Paraguayan physician plaintiff sued a former Paraguayan
police official for the alleged torture and death of the phy-
sician's son. The main issue was whether torture under
color of state authority constituted a violation of the law
of the nations.72 The district court dismissed the case on
the grounds that a government's treatment of its own sub-
jects was not within the scope of customary international
law. 73 The Second Circuit reversed and found that juris-
diction was proper under the ATS. The court explained
that an action brought under the ATS must assert a
wrongful act uniformly accepted as a violation of interna-
tional law.74 In the court's view, the "law of nations"
must be interpreted not as it was in 1789, but as it has
developed and exists in the modern world.75 Holding
that official torture of an individual constituted a clear and
unambiguous violation of international law,7 6 the Second
Circuit granted jurisdiction.
Filartiga is important in two respects. First, the Second
6 Id. at 810.
69 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
70 Id. at 862-65.
,L 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
7' Id. at 880.
73 Id.
7 I d.
7-1 Id. at 881.
7 Id. at 878.
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Circuit injected new life into the centuries old statute by
applying it to an international human rights claim. This
novel use of the statute was quickly applauded by human
rights proponents. 7 Furthermore, the statute is regarded
as a powerful force enabling the United States courts to
take an active role in vindicating human rights in the in-
ternational arena. 78  Second, the Filartiga court inter-
preted the term "law of nations" as referring to
contemporary norms of international law rather than
those existing at the time the ATS was enacted. By recog-
nizing that international law was a body of evolving prin-
ciples, the court established a wider and more flexible
basis for invoking ATS. This expansive reading of the
statute serves as the "intellectual precursor" of the Sec-
ond Circuit opinion in Amerada Hess.79
While the Filartiga court expanded the scope of ATS ju-
risdiction, the District of Columbia Circuit in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic ° adopted a much narrower analysis.
In Tel-Oren, Israeli plaintiffs brought suit against Libya
and the Palestinian Liberation Organization for claims
arising out of a terrorist attack in Israel. The court of ap-
peals dismissed the action in a unanimous decision, but
three concurring opinions were issued. These opinions
reflect the absence of agreement as to what constitutes a
violation of "the law of nations" for the purpose of assert-
ing jurisdiction under the ATS.
Judge Edwards, in his concurring opinion, stated that
' Casto, supra note 61, at 470; see also Note, Enforcement of International Human
Rights in the Federal Courts After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 67 VA. L. REV. 1379, 1393
(1981) (federal courts have an obligation to hear international human rights dis-
putes when jurisdiction is provided by the ATS); Comment, Torture as a Tort in
Violation of International Law: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 33 STAN. L. REV. 353, 368
(1981) (Filartiga holding is an important advance in human rights law).
78 See Note, Enforcing International Human Rights Law in Federal Courts: The Alien
Tort Statute and the Separation of Power, 74 GEORGETOWN L.J. 163 (1985); Comment,
The Alien Tort Statute: International Human Rights Watchdog or Simply "Historical
Trivia"?, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 341 (1988).
79 See Note, Amerada Hess and Foreign Sovereign Immunity: The Conflict Between the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Alien Tort Claims Act in Establishing Jurisdiction
Over the Extraterritorial Torts of Foreign States, 24 STAN.J. OF INT'L L. 585, 591 (1988).
m, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
ATS could be invoked when there was a tortious violation
of a principle of international law on which the commu-
nity of nations had reached a consensus.8 ' Since there
was no common understanding as to what constituted in-
ternational terrorism, no basis existed to assert jurisdic-
tion on the ground of a violation of international law
under ATS. 2 Judge Robb concurred in the dismissal on
the ground that the case was a nonjusticiable political
question and he warned against judicial interference into
politically sensitive areas, such as international terrorism,
which had traditionally been the domain of the executive
and legislative branches.8 3 Judge Bork wrote the most
controversial of the three opinions. He adopted a very
restrictive reading of the statute and reasoned that juris-
diction of the ATS was limited to those violations of inter-
national law that were recognized as actionable in 1789.4
Since international terrorism was unknown at the time of
the ATS' enactment, jurisdiction could not be sustained. 5
The divergent opinions in Tel-Oren demonstrate the de-
gree of uncertainty affecting the jurisdictional analysis of
the ATS.
C. Interplay Between FSIA and A TS
Notwithstanding that fact that Tel-Oren limited the realm
of possibilities opened by Filartiga,6 a few cases have at-
tempted to bypass the FSIA's jurisdictional provisions by
invoking the ATS in suits against a foreign sovereign
state. The crucial issue in these cases and in Amerada Hess
is whether the ATS grants jurisdiction in situations where
the FSIA does not.
In Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, 7 the plaintiffs
brought suit against Argentina for torture and the confis-
"1 Id. at 777 (Edwards, J., concurring).
82 id. at 795-96, 798.
Id. at 823-25 (Robb, J., concurring).
Id. at 813-14 (Bork, J., concurring).
"I ld. at 819.
" Note, 39 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 8, at 1115.
17 No. CV 82-1772-RMT (Mcx), slip op. (C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 7, 1985).
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cation of property by a past military government. The
District Court for the Central District of California va-
cated an earlier default judgment against Argentina and
dismissed the case on the ground that neither the ATS
nor the FSIA provided any exception to Argentina's sov-
ereign immunity protection. The court established that
the doctrine of absolute immunity was generally recog-
nized in 1789. If Congress intended to affect that immu-
nity by enacting the ATS, Congress would have so stated
in the statute. Since the ATS is silent in this respect, the
court reasoned that the ATS did not provide an exemp-
tion for foreign sovereign immunity and therefore could
not be a basis for asserting jurisdiction over a foreign
state.8 8 After concluding that the plaintiffs cause of ac-
tion did not come under any exceptions in the FSIA, the
court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.8 9
A similar result was reached in In re Korean Air Lines Dis-
aster of Sept. 1, 1983,90 in which wrongful death claims
were brought against the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics (USSR) for deaths caused by the destruction of Ko-
rean Air Lines Flight 007. Plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction
over the USSR under both the FSIA and ATS. 9' The dis-
trict court dismissed the claims on the ground that none
of the FSIA's immunity exceptions applied to the facts of
the case.92 Furthermore, the court also refused to sustain
jurisdiction under the ATS as an alternative because "to
hold that the Alien Tort Claims Act gives a cause of action
and subject matter jurisdiction where the FSIA forbids it
would make a nullity of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act." 93 In summary, both Siderman and Korean Air Lines re-
fused to apply the ATS in suits against foreign sovereign
8" Id. at 2-3.
"" Id. at 3-4.
1m Misc. No. 83-0345, slip op. (D.D.C. filed Aug. 2, 1985).
9 ld. at 2.
112 Id. at 5-10, 15. The court rejected plaintiffs' implied waiver argument and
further ruled that action by the Soviet military was neither a "commercial activ-
ity" nor a "commercial act" with "direct effects" in the United States under sec-
tion 1605(a)(2). Id.
w, Id. at 11. In addition to the discussion of the FSIA and the ATS, the district
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states, instead jurisdiction analyses were done under the
FSIA.
A contrary view, however, was expounded in Von Dardel
v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.94 In Von Dardel the
plaintiffs sued the USSR for the arrest, detention and sub-
sequent disappearance of a Swedish diplomat.95 The dis-
trict court of the District of Columbia first concluded that
jurisdiction could be sustained under the FSIA. Relying
on the language of the statute that immunity is "subject to
international agreements," the court held that where pro-
visions of the FSIA interfered with the operation of inter-
national agreements to which the United States was a
party in 1976, FSIA must be pre-empted. 6 Since the
court determined that the USSR had violated the 1961 Vi-
enna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 97 and the 1973
Convention on Internationally Protected Persons,98 no
immunity could be granted under FSIA. 9 Furthermore,
the court also found that the USSR, by explicitly binding
itself to international human rights agreements and trea-
ties codifying diplomatic immunity, had implicitly waived
its immunity under section 1605(a)(1) of FSIA. l00
Turning to the ATS, the court held that jurisdiction
could also be sustained because the USSR's treatment of
the diplomat constituted a clear violation of international
law under all three tests of Tel-Oren.t0 ' In the final analy-
court ruled that the act of state doctrine precluded judicial interference in this
case. Id. at 11-14.
623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985), vacated, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990) (ap-
plying the Supreme Court ruling in Amerada Hess, the district court vacated its
1985 judgment because none of the FSIA exceptions to sovereign immunity ap-
plied in this case). The 1985 judgment is, however, still instrumental in depicting
the development of the law before the Supreme Court decision in Amerada Hess.
95 Id. at 248-250.
- Id. at 254 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1604).
97 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Dis-
putes, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
98 Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Per-
sons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No.
8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
- Von Dardel, 623 F. Supp. at 255.
- Id. at 255-56.
I ld. at 257-59. Under Judge Edward's test, the court found that the arrest
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sis, the Von Dardel court found that jurisdiction could be
asserted under both the FSIA and the ATS in this case. In
other words the FSIA does not preempt the ATS in a suit
against a foreign sovereign.
After Von Dardel, there was an apparent split of opinion
among the federal courts as to what should be the proper
relation between the FSIA and the ATS. The district
court in Amerada Hess adopted the approach of Siderman
and Korean Air Lines, ruling that FSIA preempted the ap-
plication of ATS in a suit against a foreign sovereign. 0 2
In contrast, the Second Circuit favored the expansive ap-
proach in Filartiga in interpreting the ATS and went even
further than Von Dardel, holding that the ATS could grant
jurisdiction over a foreign state even when the FSIA did
not. 0 3 Against this divergent array of legal opinions, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Amer-
ada Hess.'°4
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed
the Second Circuit and held in Argentine Republic v. Amer-
ada Hess Shipping Corp. 105 that the FSIA preempted the ap-
plication of the ATS in suits against foreign states. The
Court first emphasized that subject matter jurisdiction of
lower federal courts was determined by Congress through
statutory grant.'0 6 The Court then discussed the overall
framework of the FSIA and concluded that the "text and
structure of the FSIA demonstrate Congress' intention
and detention of a diplomat was a clear violation of a principle of international law
on which the community of nations had reached a consensus. Since interference
with a diplomat's right was recognized as a violation of the law of nations in 1789,
Judge Bork's test was also satisfied. Finally, the court concluded that jurisdiction
could be upheld under Judge Robb's test, as diplomatic rights are so widely ac-
cepted that allowing litigation in the United States courts to vindicate such rights
would not cause any embarrassment to the United States. Id.
102 Amerada Hess, 638 F. Supp. at 76-77.
Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 428-29.
485 U.S. 1005 (1988).
,os 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
1- Id. at 433.
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that the FSIA be the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction
over a foreign state in our courts."'' 0 7 The Court reiter-
ated its own opinion in Verlinden B. V v. Central Bank of Ni-
geria ' that subject matter jurisdiction of the district
courts in any action against a foreign sovereign depended
on the existence of one of the specific exceptions under
the FSIA. 10 9
The Supreme Court next identified the two major argu-
ments of the Second Circuit: (1) granting immunity to Ar-
gentina would be contrary to Congress' intention that
FSIA be interpreted according to international law of sov-
ereign immunity; 0 and (2) the FSIA's focus on commer-
cial concerns and Congress' failure to repeal the ATS
indicated Congress' intention to allow federal courts to
continue exercising jurisdiction over foreign states
outside the limits of the FSIA, especially in actions involv-
ing a violation of international law."'
Rebutting the first argument, Chief Justice Rehnquist
observed that Congress relied on its article 1112 power to
define and punish "offenses against the Law of Nations"
when it enacted the FSIA." 3 Moreover, the FSIA con-
tained a specific exception based on violation of interna-
tional law.' "4  From these observations, the Court
concluded that Congress did consider the violation of in-
ternational law in the legislative process and consciously
decided that immunity is available in those cases involving
alleged violations of international law that fall outside the
FSIA's exceptions.'
In response to the appellate court's second argument,
the Court pointed out that there were various reasons why
107 Id. at 434.
1- 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
- Id. at 493; Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 435.
- Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 435.
IId.
112 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
,1, HOUSE REPORT, supra note 39, at 6611.
114 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (foreign sovereign immunity will be denied in suits
where rights in property are taken in violation of international law).
" Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 435-36.
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Congress failed to repeal or amend the ATS. The inac-
tion could be explained by the "lack of certainty as to
whether the Alien Tort Statute conferred jurisdiction in
suits against foreign states."'" 6  The Court noted that
since the ATS was enacted in 1789, only one United
States court had exercised jurisdiction over a foreign sov-
ereign under the statute."17 Furthermore, in view of the
comprehensive scope of the FSIA, the legislative his-
tory,1 8 and the statutory language" 9 pertaining to the
preemptive nature of the statute, the Court found that not
"even the most meticulous draftsman would have con-
cluded that Congress also needed to amend pro tanto the
Alien Tort Statute .... ,,20 Finally, the Court held that it
was not necessary for Congress to amend or repeal the
ATS when enacting the FSIA because the two statutes did
not supplement one another, nor was it a situation where
a more general statute impliedly repealed an earlier stat-
ute with a narrower subject.12 ' After rebuffing the Second
Circuit's arguments, the Court concluded that the "FSIA
provides the sole basis for asserting jurisdiction over a
foreign state in federal court."'122
The Court then turned to examine the arguments
raised by the respondents. Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
116 Id. at 436.
117 Id. The Court referred to Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Social Republics,
623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985), vacated, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990). See supra
notes 94-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
1, Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 438. The FSIA "sets forth the sole and exclusive
standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by for-
eign states .... It is intended to preempt any other State or Federal law (exclud-
ing applicable international agreements) for according immunity to foreign
sovereigns .... HousE REPORT, supra note 38, at 6610.
,,, Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 437. Section 1602 of the FSIA provides that
"[c]laims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of
the United States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter." Id.
(emphasis added by the Supreme Court).
.o Id.
212 Id. at 438.
1" Id. The Court held that the all-encompassing nature of the FSIA and the
express provision of section 1604 that "a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided
in sections 1605-1607," necessarily precluded the application of the ATS in this
case. Id.
[56
jected the assertion that, in addition to the FSIA, the gen-
eral admiralty and maritime jurisdiction provision under
section 1333(1)123 provided the courts with jurisdiction in
cases concerning violations of international law. The
Court ruled that unless the present case was within sec-
tion 1605(b), which expressly permits in personam suits in
admiralty against a foreign state, 24 or another exception
to the FSIA, section 1333(1) did not authorize the claim
against the petitioner.12 5
As to the question of whether any of the exceptions
enumerated in the FSIA applied to the case at bar, the
respondents argued that the noncommercial torts excep-
tion under section 1605(a)(5) 26 was most on point. Not-
ing that section 1605(a)(5) applies only to cases in which
damage to property occurred in the United States, the
Court held that the exception was inapplicable because
the bombing of the Hercules happened far outside the
three-mile limit of the United States territorial waters. 127
Based on the fact that the FSIA was enacted "[s]ubject
to international agreements to which the United States is
123 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1988). The section provides that "the district courts
shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any
civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all
other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." Id.
W4 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b). Subject to certain conditions, the section provides
that:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States in any case in which a suit in admiralty is
brought to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of the
foreign state which maritime lien is based upon a commercial activity
of the foreign state.
Id.
I Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 438-39.
126 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). The section provides that a foreign state shall not
be immune from jurisdiction of United States courts in any case:
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for per-
sonal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in
the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that
foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while
acting within the scope of his office or employment.
Id.
2 7 Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 439.41.
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a party at the time of the enactment,"1 2 8 the respondents
claimed that the Geneva Convention on the High Sea 29
and the Pan American Maritime Neutrality Convention,' 3"
to which both the United States and Argentina are parties,
created an exception to the FSIA. The Court disagreed
with their reasoning, noting that these conventions pro-
vided for rules of conduct and compensation, but did not
create a private right of action for recovery against foreign
states.'l3  Moreover, the Court held that a foreign state
could not waive its immunity under section 1605(a)(1) of
the FSIA simply by signing an international agreement
without an explicit provision waiving immunity to suits in
United States courts. 3 2 Next, the respondents contended
that the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the United States and Liberia'3 3 carved out an
exception to the FSIA. While agreeing that the treaty
provides Liberian nationals freedom of access to United
States courts, ChiefJustice Rehnquist pointed out that the
provision allowed access to these courts only in conform-
ity with the system of local laws which included the
FSIA. 1 4
Finally, the Supreme Court unequivocally held that
FSIA provides the sole basis for asserting jurisdiction over
a foreign state in United States courts. Since none of the
exceptions under FSIA applied to the case at bar, the
judgment of the court of appeals was reversed.' 3 5
t2a 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
I- Law of the Sea Convention on the High Sea, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
1 Pan American Maritime Neutrality Convention, Feb. 20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1989,
1990-91, T.S. No. 845.
is Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 442.
132 Id.
1. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between United States of
America and Liberia, Aug. 8, 1938, United States-Liberia, 54 Stat. 1739, T.S. No.
956.
,34 Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 443.
'. Id. Justice Blackmun and Justice Marshall filed a joint concurring opinion.
BothJustices agreed with the majority's determination with regard to the preemp-




The Supreme Court decision clarifies one unsettled
area of foreign sovereign immunity jurisprudence by de-
lineating the relationship between the FSIA and the ATS.
Officially recognizing the preemptive nature of the FSIA,
the Court has effectively precluded any future attempts to
assert jurisdiction over a foreign state outside the parame-
ters of the FSIA. i3 6 The decision introduces a measure of
certainty in future litigation involving foreign sovereigns
because parties will henceforth be able to rely on the FSIA
as the exclusive basis for obtaining jurisdiction.
The Court's analysis of the exceptions under the FSIA
is far from expansive. With regard to the noncommercial
torts exception, the Court construed the term "occurring
in the United States"'13 7 as describing the area within the
three-mile territorial waters limit, 3 8 thereby excluding
the applicability of the exception to injury occurring on
the high seas. In addition, the Court narrowly interpreted
existing international agreements for finding an exception
to immunity under the FSIA. To invoke the section 1604
international agreement exception or waiver under sec-
tion 1605(a)(1), an international convention must either
create a private right of action against foreign states or
contain an explicit provision of waiver of immunity to suit
in United States courts.13 9
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion also impacts the ap-
plicability of the ATS. By asserting the preemptive nature
of FSIA, the Court narrowed the class of potential defend-
ants that can be sued under the ATS. After Amerada Hess,
plaintiffs injured abroad by a foreign state's tortious ac-
question of whether the FSIA's exceptions were applicable to the present claim,
the case should be remanded. Id. at 443-44.
1- Note, 77 CALIF. L. REV., supra note 8, at 376.
'3 See U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5); see also supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
,-1 The President of the United States announced the recognition of a territo-
rial waters limit of 12 nautical miles on December 28, 1988. See Amerada Hess, 488
U.S. at 441 n.8 (quoting Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (1989)).
"9 For a discussion of the waiver provisions, see supra notes 128-34 and accom-
panying text.
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tions cannot bring suits in the United States under the
FSIA, nor can they bring actions under the ATS. The de-
cision seems to reflect a reluctance to expand the judici-
ary's role in vindicating international human rights, at
least in a situation where a foreign state is a defendant.
By stating that the ATS "of course has the same effect af-
ter the passage of the FSIA as before with respect to de-
fendants other than foreign states," 40 however, the Court
left intact a recent series of international human rights
cases which used the ATS as a jurisdictional basis for tort
actions against foreign public officials.' 4' Although Amer-
ada Hess clarifies the applicability of ATS in foreign sover-
eign immunity cases, it does not give any definitive
answers to the questions of when and by whom jurisdic-
tion can be invoked under the ATS. Until the Supreme
Court or Congress speaks again on the ATS, the lower
courts will have to continue to explore the uncertain field
of the statute on their own.
V. CONCLUSION
The diverging views of the court of appeals and the
Supreme Court in Amerada Hess underscore the tension
between the protection of individual rights and the doc-
trine of foreign sovereign immunity. 142 While the Second
Circuit's attempt to defend individual property rights by
denying immunity to a foreign state acting in violation of
international law is laudable, the court's reasoning is le-
gally unsound.' 4' The Supreme Court is undoubtedly
correct in holding that the FSIA provides the exclusive ba-
sis for asserting jurisdiction over foreign states. The leg-
islative history, statutory language, and structure of the
FSIA bear out this conclusion.
140 Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 438.
141 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Forti v. Suarez-Ma-
son, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see also supra notes 71-85 and accompany-
ing text.
142 See Note, 77 CALIF. L. REV., supra note 8, at 376.
143 For criticisms of the Second Circuit decision, see supra note 8.
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Although the Amerada Hess decision does not provide
satisfactory answers to all the questions pertaining to the
applicability of the FSIA and ATS, it does successfully ac-
complish one fundamental goal of Congress in enacting
the FSIA: to achieve uniformity in foreign sovereign im-
munity determinations.
Pik-Kwan Ho
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